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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOAN E. DAVIS, et al.,
Appellant,
vs.

No. 88-282

STATE OF UTAH,

Priority 14(b)

Respondent.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The issues that Appellant Joan Davis has raised on
appeal are properly before this Court.

Respondent contends,

however, that the record does not support the issues raised.

In

fact, contrary to the State's assertion, specific trial
objections, counsel's arguments, the face of the record, and
plain error sufficiently support all issues raised by Ms. Davis
on appeal.

The record also evidences that the State was aware of

all of the issues raised on appeal and should have addressed
these issues in its brief in chief.
First, L. Bruce Larsen, Joan Davis's attorney at the
forfeiture proceedings specifically objected to the use of
statements taken in violation of Ms. Davis's Miranda Rights.
Despite Mr. Larsen's timely objection, the trial judge
nevertheless permitted officer McCarthy's testimony in which he
overheard Ms. Davis make incriminating statements regardi-ng the
Dodge Van ownership.

Second, trial counsel specifically

questioned Officer McCarthy about the lack of a seizure warrant;
Officer McCarthy conceded that no warrant was ever issued to

justify the Van's seizure.
to by the State.
103.x

This line of questioning was objected

Mr. Larsen offered proof as required by Rule

The State now claims it lacked sufficient notice of this

issue even though an offer of proof was presented by trial
counsel.2

Even if the court finds Ms. Davis's offer of proof

inadequate, the seizure, without first obtaining a warrant from
an independant magistrate, still qualifies as plain error.
The record also demonstrates that it was plain error
and a violation of the Utah and United States Constitutions for
forfeiture to take place in this case.

The nature of the

transaction, the amount involved and the absence of any other
transaction or acknowledgement of the State's alleged transaction
should have indicated to the trial judge that it was error for
the van to be forfeited.

The plain error test is met because the

trial judge should have identified that forfeiture of the van
under these circumstances was grossly disproportionate to the

In his questions directed to Officer McCarthy, Mr. Larsen
attempted to establish that Metro Narcotics Agents failed to follow
appropriate procedures in executing the forfeiture process (R. 53).
Mr. Skordas objected on the basis of relevancy (R. 53). The trial
judge rejected a generalized inquiry into Metro Narcotics
procedures, but allowed trial counsel to ask questions pertaining
to inappropriate seizure in the present case (R. 54). As part of
the inappropriate procedure line of questions, Mr. Larsen asked
Officer McCarthy if a warrant had been issued for the seizure of
Ms. Davis's Van. Officer McCarthy knew of no warrant, he simply
confiscated the Van on his belief that it was "common procedure".
2

Mr. Larsen's line of questioning and offer of proof was
based on inappropriate procedures followed by Metro Narcotic's
agents when executing the forfeiture process. One question asked
was whether it was proper procedure to take Ms. Davis's vehicle
without a search warrant.
2

crime itself and a violation of the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I Section 9, of the Utah
Constitution.
Finally, the trial record indicates that the penalty is
simply inconsistent with the plain intent of Utah's forfeiture
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13. The facts of the instant
case must be considered in the context of the intent of the
statute.

Should this Court determine that the facts and plain

intent of the statute are to be considered separately, the record
demonstrates that it was plain error for the trial judge to order
forfeiture in the proceeding below.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE ISSUES THAT APPELLANT RAISES IN HER BRIEF IN CHIEF
ARE PROPERLY RAISED ON APPEAL.
(In reply to Respondentf s Point I.)
The State of Utah argues that the issues raised by the

Ms. Davis are improper because they were not appropriately raised
with the trial court.

(Resp. at 4).

Specifically, the State

argues that Appellant's issues I (forfeiture is unconstitutional
because it is grossly disproportionate to crime), II (forfeiture
of Ms. Davis's Van violates plain intent of section 58-37-13), IV
(evidence in violation of Miranda is inadmissable in civil
proceeding), and V (warrantless seizure invalidates proceedings
below), supra, are improper for appeal.

The State of Utah states

that the sole issue was determined by Judge Frederick.
3

Judge

Frederick framed the issue as "whether claimants Gerald Davis or
his wife Joan Davis was the owner of the vehicle in question and
whether or not the claimant Rosalee Hansen possessed a bona fide
security interest precluding forfeiture at least to the extent of
her, Rosalee Hansen's claimed interests."

(Resp. Brief at 4-5

citing R.38 p.4).
The State's sweeping argument suggests that an
appellate court must ignore objections or sub-issues raised
during a judicial proceeding but not directly related to the
primary issue in a case.
proposition.

There is no law to support such a

Ms. Davis's issues are supported in the record by

direct objections, or alternatively, as plain error.

A.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A STATEMENT MADE WHILE IN
CRIMINAL CUSTODY, BEFORE A MIRANDA WARNING IS
GIVEN, IS ADMISSABLE IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING WAS
PROPERLY RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT.
(In reply to Respondentf s Point I and in support
of Appellant's Point IV)

The State, in its Brief, states that Ms. Davis did not
properly object to all the issues raised on appeal.

It therefore

contends that the appellate court cannot address these issues.
On the issue of whether testimony given in a civil proceeding may
be relied on in a forfeiture proceeding, the State's brief has
not addressed this issue beyond saying that the issue was not
raised with the trial court.
The State's argument on this point is inconsistent with

4

the trial record.

Indeed, Mr. Larsen specifically objected to

the admission of Ms. Davis's statement taken while she was in
police custody.

During the trial, when Officer McCarthy was

asked about his conversation with Ms. Davis regarding ownership
of the van, the following discussion took place:
Q: [By Mr. Skordas to Officer McCarthy]
and what did you say to her?

What did she say to you

MR. LARSEN: I'm going to object, your Honor, and the
basis for the objection is that I believe at this point in time
she's [Joan Davis] in custody and being asked questions. I don't
think they're admissible in court based on the Miranda decision.
THE COURT:

Well, this is a civil procedure, is it not,
Counsel?

MR. LARSEN:

It is.

THE COURT:

I'm not following your objection.

MR. LARSEN:

Submit it.

(R.II 49-50).
Trial counsel timely objected in a clear and definite
manner to the use of testimony based on statements made in
custody, without a Miranda warning.

Officer McCarthy's

statements were allowed into the forfeiture proceedings
unlawfully as pointed out in Point IV of appellant's brief.3

The

trial judge thereafter relied on Officer McCarthy's statements in
finding that the testimony of Ms. Davis lacked credibility.
3

In United States v. U.S. Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715
(1971), cited in Point IV of Ms. Davis's brief, the United States
Supreme court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination applied with equal force in civil forfeiture
proceedings. I_d. at 718.
5

Indeed, the use of this incriminating statement materially
affected the trial's outcome in two ways.

First, the trial court

found that Ms. Davis's custodial admission supported the state's
theory of ownership.

Second, the trial court found that Ms.

Davis's custodial admission was inconsistent with her testimony
at the forfeiture hearing and materially affected her
credibility.4

The State has failed to address the merits of

whether Officer McCarthy's testimony was properly allowed into
the proceedings.

B.

THE RECORD SUPPORTS THAT THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE
OF THE 1987 DODGE CARAVAN SHOULD INVALIDATE THE
PROCEEDINGS BELOW (In response to the State's
Point I and in further support of Ms. Davis's
Point V ) .
1.

The trial record demonstrates that the van
was taken without a valid seizure warrant;
that the issue is not new on appeal.

The State's noncompliance with Utah's forfeiture
statute is clear and definite from a reading of the record in
relation to the statute.

During the trial proceedings the

following colloquy took place:
Q

[By Mr. Larsen, Joan Davis' attorney at the lower court
to Officer William McCarthy]: You've been in Metro
Narcotics. Isn't it a fact that many of the officers
that are involved in that are always talking about -bragging about picking up these vehicles and getting

Judge Frederick, in ruling that Ms. Davis's testimony was
not credible and therefore did not support a security interest in
either Mr. Davis or Rosalie Hanson, relied on Ms. Davis's
statements made to Officers McCarthy and Lewellyn while she was in
custody. See Reporter's Transcript of Judge Frederick's Ruling,
at 3 (April 12, 1988).
6

them forfeited?
MR. SKORDAS:

Objection, your Honor.

That's not relevant.

MR. LARSEN:

I think it is relevant, your Honor. I think the
posture that the case is finding itself in is that
there's a reason for the officer wanting to get
that vehicle. The reason is because he wanted to
go through the forfeiture process and this is some
of the things that go on with the people in the
Metro Narcotics, how they are always talking about
and bragging about picking up certain vehicles and
obtaining certain vehicles.
I think it goes to the intent and credibility
on that aspect.

THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Larsen, what these members of the Metro
Strike Force do on a general basis, what they talk
about on a general basis, I am inclined to think,
is not relevant.
If, on the contrary, you're able to establish
that there is something less than a
straightforward, appropriate attitude in the
seizure of this particular vehicle, that is
definitely an area of inquiry which I'll allow.
(emphasis added)

Q:

Did you have a warrant to seize the vehicle?

A:

I don't know if he did or not.

Q:

In fact, there was no warrant.
Do you know of anything, even today are you
aware of any warrant that there was to seize
that vehicle?

MR. SKORDAS:

Objection, it's been asked and answered.

THE COURT:

Well, the witness has testified, as I recall, that
he didn't know if there was a warrant or not for
the seizure or an order for seizure.
You've stated, Counsel, that there was no
warrant.

Q (By Mr. Larsen to Officer McCarthy): In reviewing this matter
with Mr. Olson today, did that give you any other information
about whether or not there was a warrant for the seizure of the
vehicle?

7

A:

I don't have any knowledge of one.

Q:

Do you have any idea of the grounds why they
took the vehicle?

A:

Only that itys common procedure.
way I've done it.

That's the

(emphasis added)

(R.II 53-55).
Further, the preliminary hearing transcript of Officer
Olson (entered as an exhibit during the proceedings below) reads:
Q (By Mr. Larsen):

Do you recall any other time you were in her
[Ms. Davis] van?

A:

Only when it was seized to search it.

Q:

And this was on what day?

A:

I think it was the 19th. The 19th of Jan.
1988.
Did you have a search warrant for the van at
that time?
No.

Q:
A:

(Preliminary hearing transcript of State v. Joan Davis, Officer
Olson's testimony at 14).
After Mr. Skordas's objection to Mr. Larsen's line of
questioning, Mr. Larsen continued.

Judge Frederick allowed the

offer of testimony provided that there must be "something less
than a straightforward, appropriate attitude in the seizure of
this particular vehicle."

(R.II 54). Indeed, Mr. Larsen's

continued questioning, revealed that the Van was confiscated by
Metro Narcotics without first complying with the warrant
requirement expressed in the forfeiture statute.

8

The issue is

not being raised for the first time on appeal.

Mr. Larsen

questioned both Officers Olson and McCarthy in an effort to
establish whether the officer's procedures complied with
statutory requirements.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 reads in pertinent part:
(2) Property subject to forfeiture
under this act may be seized by any peace
officer of this state upon process issued by
any court having jurisdiction over the
property, (emphasis added) However, seizure
without process may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an
arrest or search under a search warrant or an
inspection under an administrative inspection
warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has
been the subject of a prior judgment in favor
of the state in a criminal injunction or
forfeiture proceeding under this act;
(c) the peace officer has probable
cause to believe that the property is
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or
safety; or
(d) the peace officer has probable
cause to believe that the property has been
used or intended to be used in violation of
this act. . . .
(Emphasis added).
The evidence presented at the forfeiture proceeding
established that no warrant was issued for forfeiture of the 1987
Dodge Van (R.II. 54; Preliminary Hearing Transcript of Joan
Davis, Officer Olson's testimony at 14).

Seizure of a vehicle

can only be "upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction
over the property."

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (1988 crim. supp.)

9

(emphasis added).5
Officer William McCarthy was not aware of any warrant
to seize the vehicle and that it was not seized upon process
issued.

(R.II. 54). The grounds for taking the vehicle were

stated by Officer McCarthy as "common procedure".

(R.II. 55).

This State action violated Joan Davis's fourth amendment rights,
her Article I and 14 Utah Constitutional rights and Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-13.6
Judge Frederick heard testimony of the officers'
failure to produce a seizure warrant and their failure to seize
the Van in accordance with process issued in compliance with
applicable Utah law.

Nevertheless, the judge did not consider

this evidence; he instead framed the issue as whether Mr. Davis
or Ms. Hansen maintained a security interest in the Van.

See

Transcript of Judge Frederick's Ruling (April 12, 1988).
The state contends that the improper procedure issue was
neither raised by the pleadings nor addressed by the trial court,
but is instead raised for the first time on appeal. Lane v. Messer,
731 p. 2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986). Mr. Larsen raised the issue of
inappropriate procedure through cross-examination of Officers
McCarthy and Olson. Trial counsel did not, however, specifically
raise the Fourth Ammendment warrant issue in any pre-trial or posttrial motion as would be appropriate in a criminal proceeding
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g), 23 (Arrest of judgment), or 24
(New trial).
6

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme
Court recognize a requirement that police officers first
demonstrate to a magistrate the existence of probable cause to
support issuance of a search and seizure warrant. See Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213,287, n. 10 (1983), State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,
267 (Utah 1985), State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987).
A reviewing court should pay great deference to a magistrate's
determination of probable cause. State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363,
1364 (Utah App. 1987).
10

2. Even if the Court Finds Trial Counsel Did Not
Correctly Raise the Warrant Issue During the Forfeiture
Proceedings, the Doctrine of Plain Error Supports
Reversal on this Point.

The Utah Supreme Court's recent decisions in State v.
Eldredge, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah 1989) and State v. Verde,
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (1989) set out plain error standards.
Plain error consists of errors that this Court deems harmful and,
although not properly preserved below, their erroneous character
is obvious.

Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39.

In Eldredge this court stated:
the premise of rule 103(a) is assured because
of the severe sanction that follows
noncompliance: a refusal by the appellate
court to consider the issue. However, the
premise of rule 103(d) is that the ends of
justice must not be lost sight of in the
pursuit of procedural regularity and that
when an error is plain, a trial court can
legitimately be said to have had a reasonable
opportunity to address and correct it, even
in the absence of an objection.
Eldredge, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18.

Justice Stewart's dissent

explained:
All that our cases have required by way of
standards for invoking the doctrine is the
rather general requirement that the error
must be palpable and 'made to appear on the
face of the record and to the manifest
prejudice of the accused. . . .'
Id. at 24 (citing State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 898, 102, 60 P.2d 952,
958 (1936).

The opinion in Verde further explained:

First, the error must be "plain' or
"manifest.' This is sometimes termed an
11

"obviousness' requirement. After examining
the record, an appellate court must be able
to say "that it should have been obvious to a
trial court that it was committing error.'
Second, the error must be of sufficient
magnitude that it affects the substantial
rights of a party. In other words, applying
the standard we explained in State v. Knight,
734 P.2d at 919, the appellant must show a
reasonable likelihood that absent the error,
the outcome below would have been more
favorable.
Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, it should have been obvious to the
trial court that the police committed error by not obtaining a
warrant from a neutral magistrate before seizing Ms. Davis's van.
The trial judge was aware that the seizure was done three months
after the one alleged transaction involving the van.
Furthermore, the trial judge was aware that the seizure was done
without any warrant and without process.

He heard testimony from

two police officers that no warrant was issued before the Van was
seized.

He also had the opportunity to correct such error by

addressing this issue in his Findings of Fact.

In this case, the

error of allowing forfeiture is plain, manifest, and appears
clearly on the record.

The first requirement of the plain error

test is satisfied.
The second prong of the plain error test - whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the
outcome would have been more favorable is also met.

Indeed, the

purpose of the warrant requirement is to have an independent
magistrate objectively review the facts and determine whether

12

probably cause justifies seizure. See Supra Note 6.

Police

officers lack justification to seize property without a warrant.
Merely because it is the "customary" practice, as described by
Officer McCarthy, of police officers to seize a vehicle in a
forfeiture proceeding without subscribing to the requirements of
the statute does not constitutionally justify such behavior.
The failure of the court to address the Miranda issue
also materially affected the outcome of the forfeiture
proceedings in two crucial aspects.

First, the trial judge found

that Ms. Davis's custodial admission supported his finding of
ownership.7

Second, the judge found that the statement

negatively affected Ms. Davis's credibility.8

Absent this error,

the trial outcome would have been more favorable to Ms. Davis.
The trial judge was incorrect in allowing admission of this

Judge Frederick specifically stated that Ms. Davis's
statement made while in the custody of Officers McCarthy and
Lewellyn supported the State's theory of ownership. See Reporter's
transcript of Judge Frederick's ruling, at 4.
8

The credibility issue was material to Ms. Davis's case.
Mr. Larsen established on cross-examination that the credibility
of Officer Olson was also in question.
There were several
inconsistencies between Officer Olson's testimony at trial and his
prior statements and reports.
Judge Frederick resolved the
credibility issue in favor of officer Olson and against Ms. Davis.
Judge Frederick stated as follows: "This court views the testimony
of Officer Steve Olsen as more credible than the testimony of Ms.
Joan Davis . . ." Reporter's Transcript of Judge Frederick's
Ruling, p. 3. The judge further stated: "The testimony of the
petitioners in this case, in the Court's judgment, was not credible
in certain critical particulars." Id. at 4. One of the critical
areas affecting credibility was where "Joan Davis told the seizing
officers, McCarthy and Lewellyn, [before being read Miranda Rights]
that the vehicle was hers and that it was paid for. Yet she
testified in court at trial that the vehicle belonged to her
husband and that there were sums owed on the vehicle." Id. at 4.
13

statement.

See U.S. Coin and Currency/ 401 U.S. 715.

C.

THE RECORD SUPPORTS THAT THE RESULT IN THIS CASE
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. (In reply to Respondent's
Point I and in support of Appellant's Point I).

Applying the plain error standard, above, it is clear
that the Constitutions of the United States and Utah have been
violated.
In addition to the Constitutional error of searching
and seizing Ms. Davis' van without a warrant, the trial judge
acted erroneously by allowing a sentence grossly disproportionate
to the crime committed.
The nature of the error was manifest or obvious.

The

facts of the case, see Point I in Appellant's Brief in Chief,
support that this was not a case that the Utah forfeiture statute
was intended to include.

In addition to the nature of the

transaction, the amount involved and the fact that there was
never any other transaction or acknowledgement of the State's
alleged transaction should have indicated to the trial judge that
it was error for the van to be forfeited.

The first prong of the

plain error test is met because the trial judge should have
identified that forfeiture of the van under these circumstances
was grossly disproportionate to the crime itself in violation of
the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I Section 9, of the Utah Constitution.
Furthermore, Ms. Davis' Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights were violated.

Recognition of such a violation would have

provided a much more favorable outcome to Ms. Davis at the
14

forfeiture proceeding.

The disproportionate nature of the

punishment considering the circumstances of the crime does not
justify forfeiture.
D.

FORFEITURE WAS INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE AND VIOLATES THE PLAIN INTENT OF UTAH'S
FORFEITURE STATUTE (In reply to Respondent's
Points I and II and in support of Appellant's
Point II)

The State's Brief in Chief divides Appellant's Point II
into two separate issues. Ms. Davis's issues presented for
review reads: "Is the taking and subsequent sale of the 1987
Dodge Caravan supported by the facts of this case and the plain
intent of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13?" (App. Brief in Chief at
vii).

The issue as presented in the State's Point I for

dismissal reads: "Is the taking and subsequent sale of the 1987
Dodge Caravan supported by the plain intent of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-13?"

(Resp. at 4 ) .
The State does not provide a reason why the facts

should not be discussed in the context of the purpose and plain
intent of the statute.

Ms. Davis's trial counsel at the lower

court made a complete record of the factual problems in the
context of Utah's forfeiture statute.

The facts, testimony, and

objections made and cited to in Ms. Davis's Brief in Chief on
this point do not go to the question of whether there was a
security interest on the vehicle, but rather go to the very facts
in the context of the plain intent of Utah's forfeiture statute.
The State addresses the question of forfeiture being
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appropriate under the state's version of the facts only (Resp.
Brief at 5-6) but does not address the factual issues in the
context of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 and the plain intent of that
statute.
Ms. Davis would ask this Court to view the facts in the
complete context of the proceedings below, according to whether
the facts in this case justify forfeiture under the plain intent
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13. While Ms. Davis acknowledges that
the facts as presented by her witnesses are not always identical
with the State's primary witness, Officer Olson, she would
emphasize to the Court that either view of the facts of this case
do not support forfeiture pursuant to the purpose and plain
intent of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13.
Ms. Davis has detailed the facts as presented by both
the State and Appellant, and has provided this Court with current
research and law regarding the purpose and intent of Utah's
forfeiture statute in Point II of Appellant's Brief in Chief at
13-20.

There is no fact to support that Joan Davis purchased,

sold, distributed, or transported marijuana for purposes of the
statute on forfeiture as this Court and the Utah legislature have
defined those terms.
If this Court should sever the issue of whether
forfeiture is supported by the facts of this case in the context
of the plain intent of Utah's forfeiture statute, then Ms. Davis
would ask this court to apply a plain error analysis.
Ms. Davis has been accused of committing a crime which
16

has resulted in a civil forfeiture proceeding against her and her
family's property.

The facts as detailed in her Brief in Chief

support manifest error.

Ms. Davis's Constitutional rights were

violated; the facts in this case when viewed in the context of
Utah's Forfeiture statute do not rise to the plain intent of the
statute as identified and defined by this Court and the Utah
legislature.

II.

A SECURITY INTEREST FOR PURPOSES OF REGISTRATION WITH
THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND A SECURITY
INTEREST FOR PURPOSES OF FORFEITURE BY POLICE SEIZURE
ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS. (In reply to Respondent's Points
III, IV, and V VI and in support of Appellant's Point
III.)

The State's Points III, IV, V, and VI go to the issue
of the existence of a security interest and what is required for
a security interest under Utah law.

In support of its

interpretation Respondent has not cited a single Utah case.9 The
State's heading makes the argument that "Certificate of Title is
Absolute Evidence of Ownership" (emphasis added).

The State has

given no authority for such a proposition.
The State uses the Oregon case of French v. Barrett,
733 P.2d 89 (Or. 1987) for the proposition that "in applying the
Family Purposes doctrine, the certificate of title constitutes
prima facie evidence of ownership."
9

(Resp. Brief at 7).

The

The State cites to French v. Barrett, 733 P.2d 89 (Or.
1987), and also cites to Kovacich v. Norgaard, 716 P.2d 633, 634
(Mont. 1986) another non-binding opinion.
17

family purpose doctrine provides that "[a]n owner who maintains
an automobile for the pleasure or convenience of his family is
liable if a member of the family negligently uses the car for
pleasure or convenience with the knowledge and consent of the
owner."

French, 733 P.2d at 91. The family purpose doctrine is

not at issue in the instant case.
French makes clear, however, that such prima facie
evidence may be rebutted and overcome.
92.

See French, 733 P.2d at

Ms. Davis provided rebuttable evidence at trial.

She would

ask this Court to review the rebuttable evidence presented in
Point III of Appellant's Brief in Chief.

Furthermore, the Utah

Code does not require a perfected security interest, but only a
bona fide interest and permits anyone that claims an interest in
the vehicle to petition the Court for a release of that interest.
When Ms. Davis submitted her initial brief, she was
unaware of Utah Case Law on the issue of whether an unperfected
security interest constitutes a bona fide security interest under
Utah's forfeiture statute.

On March 15, 1989, the Utah Court of

Appeals decided State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682
(Utah App. 1989).

The issue presented in that case, as in the

present case, was whether an unperfected security interest in a
forfeited automobile could be recovered by the third persons
holding the interest.

In the Pontiac Trans Am case, the state

seized defendant's Trans Am after arresting him for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute.
initiated forfeiture proceedings.
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The State subsequently

In One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, the Lauritos, defendant's
grandparents, loaned defendant money to purchase the Trans Am.
At the trial, the Lauritos produced an unperfected security
document evidencing the loan.

The trial court held that even

though the Lauritos did not have a perfected security interest in
the Trans Am, the grandparents still nevertheless believed they
had a lien against the auto to secure their loan.

Accordingly,

the trial court ordered forfeiture subject to the Lauritos's
$3,883 interest.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's

decision. 771 P.2d at 686.
The Court of Appeals stated as follows:
There is nothing in the context of § 5837-13 suggesting the Legilsature intended
"bona fide" to be interpreted other than
according to its plain meaning, and we,
therefore, reject the State's argument that
the forfeiture statute should be interpreted
as recognizing only perfected security
interests as "bona fide". The Utah
Legilature did not specify that a security
interest must be perfected before it is
protected under the criminal forfeiture
statute, rather the Legislature merely stated
it must be "bona fide." (emphasis added)
Id. 771 P.2d at 685
The Court of Appeals held that a security interest is
"bona fide" under the forfeiture statute if a third party can
establish an "actual, good faith interest in the property not
derived by fraud or deceit." 16.

In the instant case, Rosalee

Hanson loaned Mr. & Mrs. Davis $10,000 to purchase the Dodge Van.
Ms. Hanson and Mr. Davis executed a written agreement in which
Mr. Davis agreed to make monthly payments to Ms. Hansen.
19

As in

the Pontiac Trans Am case, Ms. Hansen failed to properly perfect
her security interest.

She believed, however, as did the

Lauritos, that the Davis's would repay the loan and that she had
a valid lien against the Van to secure the loan.

Furthermore,

the State does not claim that either Mr. Davis or Rosalee Hansen
knew of the alleged illegal use of the Van for transportation of
drugs.

Under the facts presented in the instant case, the Court

should conclude that Ms. Hanson maintained a bona fide security
interest within the meaning of section 58-37-13.

See One Pontiac

Trans Am, 771 P.2d at 685.
CONCLUSION

For any and all of the foregoing reasons and reasons
stated in Appellant's Brief in Chief, Appellant respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the opinion of the lower court
allowing for forfeiture of the 1987 Dodge Van and remand the case
to the district court for either dismissal with return of the van
(or its approximate value) or a new hearing.
Respectfully submitted this ,^C)

'CUtrPl

day of June, 1989.

L. p a r i e s Spafforc^
Attorney for Appellant

20

Certificate of Delivery
I, L. Charles Spafford, hereby certify that ten copies
of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court,
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the
County Attorney's Office, 2001 South State, #S 3400, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, this £/

DELIVERED by
day of June, 1989.

day of June 1989.

this

